. Rowntree's poverty cycle in York, England, 1899. different sociopolitical strategies have been in eliminating poverty over the life cycle. We hope to add to earlier studies by examining changes within individual countries and by comparing trends cross-nationally. Here we follow a growing number of researchers who, instead of relying only on cross-sectional data, increasingly make use of the possibilities provided by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), with data for different countries and different points in time (e.g., [5] [6] [7] [8] . Our analysis follows Rowntree's example and employs a life-cycle perspective. We also attempt to explain changes in poverty, or the absence of such changes, by linking them to the design of and changes in social security provisions.
In a strict sense, an analysis of poverty cycles would demand a dynamic approach in which we could follow the same individuals from childhood to old age. Unfortunately, the LIS is not a panel data set, and we must be satisfied with trend analyses, which are not as powerful a tool as longitudinal panel analysis but are powerful enough to shed light on the relationship between life cycles, social policy programs, and poverty. In this respect we are in a slightly better position than Rowntree, who based his first study on cross-sectional data.
Because Rowntree found that pensioners and families with children are particularly highly exposed to poverty, we would expect family support policies and pension programs to be of special relevance in eliminating life-cycle poverty. We therefore focus our attention on family policy and pension systems in our analysis of the effects of social policy solutions to cyclical poverty. How can different types of family policy solutions assist in providing a reasonable level of income? How are differences in pension security reflected in old-age poverty?
Before we go into the social policy analysis, we need to pursue our exploratory aim and actually examine whether the cyclical component of poverty still exists, even among the most advanced industrial nations. To set both the family phase and old-age poverty in a relevant context, we first look at the incidence of poverty throughout life cycles in different countries and over periods of time.
DATA AND METHODS
The data on income distribution used here are, with one exception, taken from the Luxembourg Income Study database, which has information on household incomes for some 30 countries. For certain countries, the LIS has cross-sectional data that cover quite a long period. In the case of Sweden, for example, the earliest LIS data are from 1967 and the most recent from 1997. For both Canada and the United States there are data from the early 1970s. For the first waves of Finnish data (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) we used the Finnish household surveys (not available in the LIS) and transformed them to correspond to the LIS income concepts. We assume that a period of two or three decades is long enough to assess both poverty trends and the potential effects of differences in social security provisions.
The analysis of income distribution data follows the standard procedures (e.g., 9) . Hence, we analyze disposable equivalenced household income using household weights, applying the equivalence scale generally used by the OECD, which gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.7 to other adults, and 0.5 to each child.
We selected for analysis countries that represent different types of social policy models. Data on social rights are derived from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP), a database containing information on the development of social security programs in 18 OECD countries (for more information on SCIP, see 10). In this article we use data on old-age pensions and family support. In addition, we have extracted information on child-care coverage from OECD data (11) .
Finland and Sweden represent the so-called Nordic/Scandinavian welfare states. In the pension area, these two countries combine citizenship/residencebased basic benefits with earnings-related provisions. In family policy, relatively generous cash support has typically been combined with high levels of social services-for example day care, which has permitted mothers to have high participation rates in the labor market. This applies to both single mothers and married or co-habitating women.
We selected Germany to represent the Central European countries, where corporatist social insurance provisions are strongly earnings-related. Germany has only a legislated earnings-related pension scheme but no real basic pension. In the family support area, the so-called male breadwinner model is applied, combining cash and fiscal benefits with reliance on mothers for child care. The Netherlands is a mix with regard to social security. In the pension policy area, the statutory benefits resemble the Nordic first tier and give high flat-rate benefits; in contrast to the Nordic countries, however, the Netherlands does not have legislated incomerelated pensions.
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have commonly been lumped together as the so-called liberal welfare states (12) . However, the four countries differ to such an extent, not least in the pension area, that we need to sort out the differences among them. Australia uses means testing in virtually all areas except work accident insurance for employees and health care and child benefits, which are partially universal; but child-care coverage, for example, has tended to be low despite some attempts to expand these services in the early 1990s. A modest flat-rate basic pension typifies the United Kingdom, but it has more recently added an earnings-related component, which improves benefit levels for those who are covered by it (or by contracted-out programs). There are universal child benefits but very poor social services for families with children, reflected in low labor participation rates for women. The emphasis in the U.S. pension system is on a contributory benefit, but ceilings are low; unlike the German system, there is a federal basic pension, albeit means-tested. The United States has no universal child cash benefits. Instead, fiscal benefits have been coupled to targeted programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Canada has created a pension security system more akin to the Nordic one than to those of other Anglo countries. However, the benefit levels and the ceilings are lower and means testing for supplementary basic benefits is more pronounced (13) . Family support in cash and in kind is closer to that in the other Anglo-liberal countries than to the Nordic model.
What we describe here are the recent formations of social security. For countries for which we have earlier data, we can examine how changes in policies have affected outcomes. We return to this later.
Given that countries have reformed their systems of social protection and applied different strategies in this process, we can examine the relationship between social policy programs and welfare outcomes. In this study we focus on the relationship between, on the one hand, family support and pensions and, on the other, poverty over the life cycle. We hence apply a form of contra-factual comparisons. What we indirectly ask is, what would happen if one country had the sociopolitical system of another country? For example, what would Finland's poverty cycle or old-age poverty be like if U.S. social policies were applied there? The kind of contra-factual comparison we engage in cannot, of course, give the final answers to these questions. The incidence of poverty is affected not only by social policies but also by many demographic and behavioral factors and by differing socioeconomic structures (for a more in-depth discussion, see 14) . What we argue, however, is that we can get some indications of where and how social policies have the potential to ameliorate poverty.
AGE-RELATED POVERTY CYCLES
Earlier comparative studies based on cross-sectional data (e.g., 4) have observed that age differences in poverty have evened out in many countries for which LIS data exist. However, the differences between countries are still substantial. Table 1 presents poverty rates by age groups for selected countries. In order to assess how sensitive the results are to the different poverty thresholds, we use three different poverty levels: we classify as poor those whose equivalent income falls below 40, 50, and 60 percent of the median income for the total population.
The 40 percent poverty threshold produces very similar profiles of poverty by age group for all countries. Low incomes in all countries are most common in the under-25 age group, an explanation for which might be that many in this group are still students. In the Swedish case, we have a measurement error related to the data being organized according to the tax record. In these records, all persons over 18 form households of their own even if they live with their parents. This results in misleadingly high levels of poverty for this group in Sweden (see 14) . In the older age groups, poverty rates even out at a certain level, and no dramatic differences are apparent between the different age groups. The United States differs from other countries: first, the poverty cycle flattens out only after the age of 40; second, even with the low, 40 percent poverty threshold, the incidence of poverty is much higher. The United States clearly has a problem in providing an accurate, basic safety net. In Europe, and especially in Finland and Sweden, the war against poverty is obviously more successful, at least when measured against the 40 percent poverty threshold. When the poverty level is raised to 50 percent of the median income for the whole population, interesting differences begin to emerge between countries or, rather, between groups of countries. The Anglo-American countries form a single group on the basis of the high rates of poverty in the under-45 age group. In the second group, consisting of the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, the poverty rate-excluding the youngest age groups-remains below 5 percent. It is interesting that in Canada, poverty among old people is about as low as in the latter three European countries.
Raising the poverty threshold to 60 percent changes the situation somewhat, and now a certain cyclical element becomes visible in some countries. Rowntree's home country, the United Kingdom, appears particularly haunted by age-related poverty. The threesome of Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland does relatively well in this comparison. Finland's situation differs insofar as, with this poverty measure, old age poses a poverty risk. A comparison of the 40 percent and 60 percent thresholds for poverty for old people indicates that pensioners have fairly strong basic security, but the income level guaranteed by the national pensions scheme is not particularly high. In this respect Finland is more similar to the United Kingdom than Sweden or the Netherlands, both of which seem to guarantee better basic pension security. Canada is an interesting case: poverty levels of people over 65 are very low in comparison to younger age groups. This further indicates that the lumping together of all Anglo-American countries in the so-called liberal welfare state model, typified by underdeveloped social security and a high incidence of poverty, is not altogether justifiable. We should pay special attention to Canada in this respect.
LIFE CYCLE-RELATED POVERTY
Rowntree's concept of cyclical poverty is linked not to age but to the different phases of family formation. Therefore, in order to sharpen the picture, we wish to examine how different stages in the life cycle are connected to poverty in different countries. The life stage variable used in Figures 2 and 3 was constructed on the basis of age groupings and information on family status. The first life-stage group consists of under-25s without children. This group is designed to represent Rowntree's young adults who are expected to do well economically. The next group consists of people between 25 and 44 years of age who have children living with them. This phase is representative of the family stage in Rowntree's poverty cycle. The prosperous empty-nest period is set between the ages 45 and 64. In most countries 65 is the general retiring age and thus seemed a good starting point for the old-age phase. To investigate change, early LIS data from the 1960s and 1970s, shown in Figure 2 for those countries for which LIS data are available (Canada (Figure 3 ). We can include more countries for the latter observation period: in addition to the four countries mentioned above, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Figure 2 shows that a quarter of a century ago, the poverty risk in all four countries varied a great deal depending on the life stage. The United States and Finland exhibited a pattern almost identical to Rowntree's. Poverty was not very common in early adulthood but rose after the birth of children, only to fall again after the children had left home. Old age in all countries was a period of low income. Development in Sweden went its own merry way, following a low U-curve. It is interesting to note that the Nordic countries did not differ from other countries with regard to old-age poverty. However, already at that time, families with children were less haunted by poverty in Sweden and Finland than in Canada and the United States.
In the 1990s (Figure 3 ), the U.S. curve remained essentially the same, with the exception that the young and families with children were somewhat worse off whereas the elderly were a little better off than previously. The relative circumstances of the young and of families with children dipped considerably; the poverty rates of the elderly fell a little. The United Kingdom remained faithful to the Rowntree pattern in the 1990s. Cyclical poverty in Canada was the most linear: highest among the young, and lowest among the elderly. In all Anglo-American countries, the family constitutes a serious poverty risk. This is obvious when comparing the childless households of 25-year-olds and 44-year-olds (not shown) with families with children. In the United States, the poverty rate of childless households was only 6.6 percent, whereas as many as 22.3 percent of families with children were categorized as poor. In the United Kingdom, the corresponding figures were 3.6 and 16.8 percent; in Canada, 6.9 and 14.0 percent. Finland and Sweden had about the same poverty rates in these two groups (3.2 percent), suggesting that family policies do make a difference (15) .
The discussion of trends has already shown that poverty among the elderly is clearly more common in the United States and the United Kingdom. Have the pension policies in the Netherlands, Canada, and the Nordic countries improved the economic standards of the elderly in relation to the working population? We return to this question below. However, before going into pension policy we briefly discuss family support and family poverty.
FAMILY POLICY AND FAMILY POVERTY
The introduction of public family support has been based on different motives and taken different forms (16) . An important motive has been to combat poverty among families with children. Here we can identify two different methods: give families more cash by paying benefits directly, or enhance the earning capacity of families by providing public subsidies for child care, thus allowing single parents to earn market income or two-parent families to have a second earner (17) . Table 2 gives some data about the provision of cash benefits and day-care services for pre-school children. The numbers reflect the size of benefits going to an average production-workers' family and are expressed as a percentage of post-tax income. In 1990, differences between the countries in our study were quite large. Direct child benefits were at about the same high level in Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, whereas the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Canada paid benefits at a lower level (in descending order). The United States did not pay child benefits except for targeted provisions. For the four countries for which we have poverty data from earlier points in time, Table 2 gives the size of benefits at that time. As the table shows, support for families has a tendency to increase, and most clearly so in Finland. However, the improvements are on average smaller than those recorded on the pension side.
Available statistics on provision of day-care services refer to 1990 and show that Finland and Sweden are far ahead of the other countries ( Table 2) . Differences between the other countries are small; Canada is a little ahead, and the United States comes out at the lowest level. For Finland and Sweden, the big expansion in child-care services occurred after 1970, which is relevant for the time-related reduction of poverty for families with children.
When comparing levels of support to families with poverty levels for families with children, the correspondence is striking. For the first observation period (1960s/1970s) the rank order is perfectly inverse to the level of cash benefits. In the 1990s, countries giving high support had lower poverty rates than countries 344 / Kangas and Palme Table 2 Family support in eight OECD countries: child benefits in cash, as percentage of an average wage in manufacturing, and an index of coverage of publicly subsidized day care for pre-school children with low support (see also 13) . If anything, the economic situation of families with children appears to have improved. Germany is a deviant case in the sense that we would expect higher poverty rates from the rather modest levels of family support.
PENSION POLICY AND OLD-AGE POVERTY
A quarter of a century ago, poverty among old people in the Nordic countries was not significantly lower than in Canada and the United States, which have traditionally been considered laggards in social policy development (see Figure 2 ). By the beginning of the 1990s, the situation had changed fundamentally. The poverty rate in the Nordic countries-over 15 percent in the mid-1960s-had fallen to below 5 percent. In Canada, too, poverty among retirees had almost been eliminated. The United States, however, did not undergo as much change in this respect; and in the United Kingdom, reaching retirement age adds to the poverty risk. In other countries we see little difference between pensioners and the active working population at the 40 and 50 percent poverty levels. With these fairly wide-ranging differences between countries, the central sociopolitical question is, to what degree can we explain these differences by structural differences in pension policies?
There are two defining features of pension policies. The first essential issue is the degree of coverage-whether all people over retirement age are in fact entitled to pensions; the second is the level of pension benefits in relation to the general income level. We investigate both of these issues here. The data on coverage and income replacement levels are from the database of the Social Citizenship Indicators Project (16) . Figure 4 shows pension security coverage between 1965 and 1990, as percentages of persons over the normal pension age who receive a statutory pension. In Finland and Sweden, pension coverage has been universal throughout the observation period. More surprisingly, perhaps, the same is true for Canada. This is in the spirit of the "people's insurance": everybody receiving benefits. In practice, the Netherlands has the same kind of residence-based pensions. However, until 1985 married women did not have the same kind of individual rights as unmarried women and men. In the United Kingdom, pension coverage is rather close to that in the two Scandinavian countries, and in Germany, pension coverage has gradually widened to include, directly or indirectly, most people above 65. For a short period of time, Australia gave up means testing and extended benefits to all those over 65. By the mid-1980s, however, the old income-testing practice was reestablished, with the result that about 40 percent of the Australian population above pensionable age did not receive statutory pensions. In this respect, the situation in the 1990s appears to be the same as in the mid-1960s. Figure 5 shows the level of basic, or minimum, pensions in relation to the average net wage of an industrial worker. What we are interested in here is the kind of benefits provided to people without contribution records, the floor of the Does Social Policy Matter? / 345 pension systems, and what this means in terms of combating poverty. We include both benefits awarded on the basis of citizenship/residence and benefits paid after income-based means testing, as long as they are called old-age pensions. As pension security in Germany is entirely determined by the contribution record of the worker or her or his spouse, Germany is not included in this comparison (see Figure 6 and below for information on contributory pensions). Over time, income replacement levels have improved in all the countries included in Figure 5 . But differences remained rather large in 1990. The minimum pensions were highest in the Netherlands. Sweden ranks ahead of Finland and Canada, in that order. Australia provided higher replacement levels than the United Kingdom and the United States.
In the figures on poverty cycles discussed above, the incidence of poverty among the Canadian elderly is strikingly low. In fact, the more or less universal basic benefit (citizenship-based minimum pensions topped up with means-tested supplements) has continued to increase in relative value since the 1960s. By the beginning of the 1990s, it had almost reached the level of the Finnish minimum pension. This is reflected in the continuously decreasing incidence of poverty among Canada's elderly: 16.2 percent in 1971, 5.7 percent in 1987, and only 2.6 percent in 1991. This Canadian achievement in pension security is an excellent example of how poverty can be abated through social policies. Yet we should remember that there is always an element of arbitrariness in drawing a poverty line. A small increase or decrease in flat-rate minimum pensions might have very large effects on poverty rates if the benefit levels are close to the poverty line.
The British experience also shows that universalism is not enough; pensions must also be large enough to raise the elderly above the poverty line. The poverty cycles shown in Figures 2 and 3 are a clear illustration of the problems of the British pension system. The benefits have been set at levels that guarantee income just above 40 percent of the median national income level. By this measure, the poverty rates of the British elderly are not dissimilar to, say, the Nordic rates. However, using the 50 and 60 percent poverty thresholds, the situation is noticeably different. At the 60 percent level, poverty among the elderly is worse in the United Kingdom than in any other country in our comparison. Figure 6 is a comparison of work pensions, assuming a full 40-year contribution record, for the period between the mid-1960s and 1990. Pension security has been calculated for a person employed for 40 years at an average wage level for production workers in manufacturing. As Figure 6 shows, the replacement value of work pensions is the highest in Sweden, Germany, and Finland. The earningsrelated pensions in both the United Kingdom and the United States have climbed toward the level of the flat-rate system in the Netherlands. Replacement levels in Canada's earnings-related pension system have also been growing steadily but have not risen above 50 percent of an average wage.
The significance of basic security becomes most clear when considering the poverty levels of 40 and 50 percent of median income. The work pension, on the other hand, is probably more important for poverty at the 60 percent level. We can assume that poverty would be less apparent at the 60 percent level in countries with high pension security, and to some degree this seems to be the case. Poverty is highest in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Table 1) , where work pensions are least generous. The high poverty threshold has the least effect in the Netherlands, which, on the basis of Figure 6 , can be considered a somewhat surprising result, as Dutch work pensions are not particularly generous. The Dutch case is special because the low prevalence of two-earner couples brings down the relative economic standards of the working-age population. Hence, even a modest pension, when compared with regular earnings, would raise an elderly person above the standard poverty lines at 40, 50, or 60 percent of the median income. Part of the explanation is also that Figure 6 shows only legislated pensions. All private pension insurance and supplementary pensions based on collective agreements have been excluded from the figure. These private pension arrangements are very common in countries with low or no income-related pensions and, of course, help reduce the poverty figures (see 12) . This means, for example, that the very highly developed agreement-based "occupational" or "private" pension security schemes in the Netherlands are outside the scope of a study of legislated social policy programs (and indeed, outside all official social expense statistics). Occupational pensions, however, like legislated pensions, do lower the incidence of poverty and are therefore of relevance for the poverty cycles. Thus, to get an accurate assessment of the impact of statutory pension programs it would be necessary to take private pension programs, individual as well as collective, into consideration.
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SOCIAL POLICIES DO MATTER
In the sociological and historical discourses on the driving forces behind the development of welfare states, the effect of politics has been a much-debated subject. A main theme in the discussion has been whether politics makes a difference (does politics matter?). Along these lines, our point of departure for this article was, does social politics matter for poverty? Figure 7 is a summary of the basis for, and central results of, this study. The "Northern Europe" curve for 1990 represents the Nordic and Central European situation, whereas the "USA" curve to a large degree depicts Anglo-American realities. This study first sought to examine possible reconfigurations of the poverty cycle (Rowntree's cycle for York) in some OECD countries. In the 1960s, cyclical poverty was still a fact of life: poverty was rare among young people with no children; families with children had great problems with subsistence; somewhat older working-age people in "empty nests" lived quite well; and the elderly were living in poverty. The stages of poverty were not so far removed from those in York, England, at the turn of the century ("York" curve in Figure 7 ).
Improved social policies in all countries have affected poverty cycles. In most countries, the young have replaced the old as the lowest income group. The persistent poverty of the later years has gone; a passing poverty of early adulthood has arrived. Also, in many countries the cycle of poverty has flattened out, and the Does Social Policy Matter? / 349 life stages are no longer significantly different. Some systematic differences between countries remain, however. High poverty rates among families with children continue to be an Anglo-American problem, as very little improvement has occurred in this area over the years. The results for the elderly are, first of all, that poverty rates have gone down in all countries as pension systems have matured and benefits have improved for other reasons. There has been a general willingness to do something about the problems of retirees through political means, but for some reason, the situation of families with children has not generated a similar mobilization. Second, the kinds of pension policies that different countries pursue make for national differences in poverty profiles. In the 1960s, for example, the incidence of poverty among the elderly was about the same in both the Nordic countries and the United States. Three decades later, we see a marked difference. The explanation in this case is straightforward: pension policies. While the Nordic countries and Canada have made considerable improvements in their pension policies since the 1960s, nothing comparable has happened in the United States.
DISCUSSION
The statistics presented in this article have shown that the kind of life-cycle poverty identified by Rowntree almost a century ago can still be observed among the most advanced industrial nations. The cycles have been affected in all countries over the most recent decades, but to very different extents. Despite a universal decline in poverty among the elderly, the differences are still substantial. In some countries, primarily in the Nordic region, poverty among families with children has also decreased and is now at levels similar to those of childless families.
A partly new phenomenon is that high rates of poverty have been registered among young adults. This might be related in part to the expansion of higher education; in welfare terms this is not very problematic, but high unemployment rates have also made young people's entry into the labor market more difficult. However, we are also struggling with some measurement problems in this context, which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions at this point.
With regard to the analytical purpose of this article-assessing the impact of social policy on poverty cycles-it goes without saying that at this stage of the analysis, we should interpret the results with great caution. However, at face value the results are quite persuasive. In comparing poverty rates we see clear indications that social policy provisions are important for explaining both cross-national and time-related variations in poverty. The clearest impact is in the pension area. In countries where the right to a basic pension is based on citizenship/residence, poverty among the elderly is virtually nonexistent, at least with the kind of measurement we have used here. When it comes to "family phase," there appears to be important potential for reducing poverty by combining cash benefits with public child-care services that increase the earning capacity of single parents and couples.
One criticism of conventional income distribution research is that it is based on cross-sectional data and ignores the life-cycle perspective. We have, to some extent, addressed these issues (albeit in a synthetic manner) by grouping the observations using a life-cycle perspective. It could be argued that lifetime income is not the only relevant income concept. Years of plenty cannot fully make up for years of poverty, especially if we consider the position of children. Children do not choose to be born of poor parents, but if they are, they simply do not get the same life chances.
As shown by comparative research on the driving forces behind the variation in social policy design, there are a certain number of possibilities for organizing social protection, and the possibility selected is to a great degree a matter of politics (e.g., [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . What this boils down to is that the eradication of poverty is, to an important extent, a matter of political choice. Rowntree made his first study at the end of the 19th century. As this new century begins, the time has come to reflect on past achievements in the war on poverty so that we can be more successful in the coming battles.
